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CORPORATIONS -

COMMENTS

RESERVED POWERS -

I20I

ABROGATION OF PRE-

FERRED DIVIDEND ARREARAGES BY CHARTER AMENDMENT, MERGER,
OR. CoNSOLIDATION The "malignant" decision in the Dartmouth
College case 1 fathered the passage of reserved-power statutes 2 in vir-

1 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 518 (1819);
Ohlinger, "Some Comments on the Reserved Power to Alter, Amend, and Repeal
Corporate Charters," 29 M1cH. L. REV. 432 (1930). The Dartmouth College case
held that the charter granted by a state to a corporation is a contract within the
"impairment'' clause of the Constitution. 31 ILL. L. REV. 661 (1937).
2 The states adopted the suggestion of Justice Story in his concurring opinion
and made express provisions in all charter grants reserving power to alter, amend, or
repeal the grant-ultimately leading to a general declaration of reserved power in the
state constitutions or statutes.
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tually all the states. These statutes, in turn, when opposed by the retaliatory fundamental-rights safeguards invoked by the courts for the
protection of corporate stockholders, procreated problems which have
grown more bafiling and incqrrigible with age. Not the least among
these 3 are proposed changes in the liabilities or rights of stockholders,
especially the attempted abolition of unpaid accrued dividends upon
cumulative preferred stock where there exists a surplus which might
lawfully be applied to the payment of such dividends.
·
Spurred by the overwhelming arrearages which accumulated during
the extended period of depressed earnings in the early and middle "thirties," 4 many corporations recently have launched extensive recapitalization programs 5 embracing in most instances the scaling down or total
destruction of accrued dividends. 6 Dissenting preferred interests gallantly accepted the challenge by setting up as their first line of defense
the nebulous but time-honored "vested rights" 7 bulwark, with its
solicitous protection of dividend accumulations. 8 The familiar device
8

The reserved power statutes produced problems regarding changes in corporate
name and place of business, in the scope of the enterprise, in the number and method
of election of directors, in the capital structure of a corporation, and many more. See
Curran, "Minority Stockholders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters," 32
MrcH. L. REv. 743 (1934).
4
25 CoRN. L. Q. 431 (1940).
5
When corporate surplus must be diverted almost in toto to the paying off of
preferred arrearages, the value of the common stock as income-producing is negligible.
Hence, a logical aftermath of business depression is the concerted demand of common
holders for reorganization to eliminate prior preferred claims. See 4 UNiv. Cm. L.
REV. 645 (1937).
6
38 MrcH. L. REv. 214 (1939).
7
The courts have waged an interesting conflict over the coverage of the elusive
"vested right'' concept, only to reach opposite conclusions with regard to many interests: amendment to increase the liability of the stockholders to corporate creditors was
permitted in Witt v. People's State Bank, 166 S. C. 1, 164 S. E. 306 (1932); contra,
cases collected in BALLANTINE, CoRPORATIONS 812 (1927); making nonassessable stock
assessable permitted in Somerville v. St. Louis M. & M. Co., 46 Mont. 268, 127 P.
464 (1912); contra, Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497, 91 P. 369 (1907);
superimposition of prior preferred over old issues allowed in Salt Lake Automobile Co.
v. Keith-O'Brien Co., 45 Utah 218, 143 P. 1015 (1914), and cases collected in note
28, infra, representing the decided weight of authority; contra, Einstein v. Raritan
Woolen Mills, 74 N. J. Eq. 624, 70 A. 295 (1908); right to redemption of preferred stock at a. stipulated price on a named date deemed vested in Sutton v. Globe
Knitting Works, 276 Mich. 200, 267 N. W. 815 (1936); contra, Davis v. Louisville
Gas & Electric Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 A. 654 (1928); alteration of right to future
cumulative preferred dividends permitted in Morris v. American Public Utilities,
14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 A. 696 (1923), whereas right to maintenance of a sinking fund
for the eventual retirement of preferred stock was declared vested in Yoakam v. Provi~
dence Biltmore Hotel Co., (D. C. R. I. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 533.
8
In protecting preferred accumulations, the courts have described the interest of
the stockholders as vested: Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., (D. C. R. I.
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of direct charter amendment was first adopted to cancel or scale down
accrued unpaid dividends,0 but this method, in the main unsuccessful,10
has quite recently given way to varied attempts to recapitalize and to
force dissenting preferred holders to acquiesce through utilization of
the procedure of statutory merger or consolidation.11 Keynoting this
trend are two leading Delaware cases. Keller v. Wilson & Co. 12 in
1936 emphatically denied the corporation's right to cancel accrued,
unpaid, and undeclared dividends by charter amendment. Federal
United Corporation v. Havender 13 in 1940 repudiated the vested
rights concept, in which refuge had theretofore been sought, and allowed repudiation of preferred arrearages by statutory merger. The
following discussion, through comparison of these and companion cases
in other jurisdictions,14, will conduct a "post-mortem" on the remains
of the vested rights limitation in order to determine the current status
of cumulative preferred dividend arrearages.
l.

Charter amendments under the state reserved-power statutes attack dividend accumulations either directly 15 through frank cancella1929) 34 F. (2d) 533; Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136,
122 A. 696 (1923); Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine Co.,
101 N. J. Eq. 554, 139 A. 50 (1927); Keller v. Wilson & Co., (Del. 1936) 190 A.
115; as a debt or a right in the nature of a debt: Morris v. American Public Utilities
Co., supra; Keller v. Wilson & Co., supra; as an existing claim which is a prior charge
on net earnings: Colgate v. United States Leather Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 72, 67 A.
657 ( 1907); or as a present property interest with enjoyment postponed: Morris v.
American Public Utilities Co., supra. In truth, the right would seem to be vested only
if the courts decide to protect it. See 25 CoRN. L. Q. 431 (1940).
9
4 UNiv. CHI. L. REV. 645 (1937).
10
Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 A. 696
(1923); General Investment Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co., 98 N. J. Eq.
326, 129 A. 244 (1925); Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine
Co., IOI N. J. Eq. 554, 139 A. 50 (1927); Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel
Co., (D. C. R. I. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 533; Keller v. Wilson & Co., (Del. 1936) 190
A. II5; Consolidated Film Industries v. Johnson, (Del. 1937) 197 A. 489. Contra,
Thomas v. Laconia Car Co., 251 Mass. 529, 146 N. E. 775 (1925).
11
38 MicH. L. REv. 214 (1939).
12
(Del. 1936) 190 A. 115, noted in 31 ILL. L. REv. 661 (1937). See also
comments in 46 YALE L. J. 985 (1937); 35 MICH. L. REV. 620 (1937).
18
(Del. 1940) II A. (2d) 331, reversing (Del. Ch. 1939) 6 A. (2d) 618 and
(Del. Ch. 1938) 2 A. (2d) 143. The supreme court opinion is noted in 26 VA.
L. REv. 822 (1940); 88 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 624 (1940); 24 MINN. L. REv. 992
(1940).
14
While the Keller and Havender cases settle only the law of Delaware, they are
extremely significant both because of the large number of corporations incorporated in
Delaware and because of their influence upon holdings in other jurisdictions.
15
4 UNiv. Cm. L. REV. 645 (1937).
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tion of arrearages, or indirectly through the creation of new prior preferred issues.1° The Keller case illustrates the former mode of attack
and illuminates the countervailing defenses. Despite the prior holding
in Morris v. American Public Utilities Co.17 that the majority stock-.
holders have no power to amend the charter of a corporation so as to
destroy claims to accumulated dividends, but fortified by a subsequent
amendment to the Delaware reserved-power statute,18 the management proposed in the Keller case a plan of recapitalization whereby
class A stock, a second preferred issue, along with all accrued and unpaid dividends,1° would be exchanged for a certain number of shares
of common. An overwhelming majority of all stockholders approved. 20
Complainant, the owner of five hundred shares of class A stock, prayed
that the charter amendment be declared void. On appeal the Supreme
Court of Delaware reversed the chancellor and held that the right to
arrearages was not a "special right" 21 under the Delaware statute, and
hence could not be abrogated under the reserved power; that this right
should be deemed "a vested right of property secured against destruction by the Federal and State Constitutions" and that
"the cancellation of cumulative dividends already accrued through
Id.
14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 A. 696 (1923).
18 At the time of the Morris case, supra, note 17, the Delaware reserved-power
statute authorized the majority to alter "preferences" of stocks. Del. Rev. Code (1915),
c. 65, § 26. In 19z7, an amendment authorized alterations in "preferences ••• and
other special rights." Del. Laws (1927), c. 85, § IO, p. z32. See Del. Rev. Code
(1935), § 2058. But note that the preferred stock in the Keller case was issued prior
to the passage of the 1927 amendment. The answer is found in Consolidated Film
Industries v. Johnson, (Del. 1937) 197 A. 489, discussed in this comment, infra, at
note 23.
19
There were accumulated and unpaid dividends on the preferred stock amounting
to $26.25 per share, or a total of $5,965,260, and unpaid dividends on the class A
stock of $21.25, totalling: $6,636,265. Wilson & Co. and its subsidiaries had at that
time an aggregate earned surplus of $8,000,000.
20 An interesting sidelight on this whole problem is the fact that in most of the
adjudicated plans in which preferred arrearages are swept away, the preferred holders
who must write off the loss approve almost unanimously. This can be attributed to the
proxy system. See Fleming, "Are Stockholders People?" 182 HARPERS MAGAZINE 422 at
427 (March, 1941), to the effect that "the stockholder's private property is being
quietly expropriated," his essential functions have atrophied, and he may be deemed
"an obsolescent economic institution."
,
21 The English courts have held that the statutory phrase "special rights and privileges" authorizes destruction of rights to accrued and unpaid cumulative dividends.
Re Oban & Aultmore-Glenlivet Distilleries, 5 Sess. Cas. (5th ser.) (Scot.) n40
(1903); Last v. Buller & Co., 36 T. L. R. 35 (Ch. D. 1919); 31 ILL. L. REv. 661
(1937). This view accords with the holding in Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp.,
(C. C. A. 2d, 1933) 65 F. (2d) 332. Cf. Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co.,
(D. C. R. I. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 533.
10

11
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passage of time is not an amendment of a charter. It is the destruction of a right in the nature of a debt...." 22
A distinction suggested by the Keller case based upon whether the date
of incorporation was prior or subsequent to the passage of the statute
authorizing the charter amendment was rejected unequivocally a short
time thereafter in Consolidated Film Industries v. Johnson. 28 The protective canopy thus projected over dividend arrearages by the Keller
case, in so far as direct amendments are concerned, has been pierced
rarely by subsequent decisions, and then only when the amendments
were implemented by broader and more specific reserved-power
statutes. 24
Cancellation of dividend arrearages by the indirect method 25 of
charter amendment embodies the formulation of recapitalization plans
offering to the old preferred the alternative of retaining their stock or
exchanging it for new prior preferred in full satisfaction of accrued
dividend claims. 26 Appraisal statutes are also available in most instances
for dissenters who prefer cash realization of the present value of their
old shares to continuation in the corporation under either alternative.2'
This procedure, as contrasted with that of direct amendment, has been
22

Keller v. Wilson & Co., (Del. 1936) 190 A. 115 at 125.
(Del. 1937) 197 A. 489.
24
In McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., (D. C. Md. 1939) 27 F. Supp.
639, accrued dividends were abrogated by charter amendment under the Maryland
reserved-power statute, expressly authorizing any amendment "which changes the
terms of any of the outstanding stock by classification, reclassification, or otherwise."
Md. Code Pub. Gen. Laws Ann. (1924), art. 23, § 28; (Supp. 1935), art. 23, § 23.
The court defined "terms" as including contract rights of the stockholders and diagnosed preferred arrearages as a contract right. See also the much more explicit Ohio
statute, infra, part 3.
25
Like the direct method, the indirect releases immediate dividends to junior
interests-but arrearages are subordinated rather than wiped out. A plan of this nature
which neglected to incorporate the option feature was flatly enjoined, and the substantiality of preferred accumulations definitely reasserted, in Harbine v. Dayton
Malleable Iron Co., 61 Ohio App. 1, 22 N. E. (2d) 281 (1939). The court said,
6 I Ohio App. at 12-13: "We have difficulty in following the designation 'has a vested
interest.' However, by whatever name known, it is an existing, substantial right, and has
a prospective value. Whether it will ever materialize, depends on whether the company
makes profits in such an amount as to be available to pay the current and cumulative
dividends.''
26
Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N. E. (2d) 127 (1938). See
also 38 M1cH. L. REv. 214 (1939).
27
For a fuller discussion of the adequacy of appraisal and cash payment in these
situations, see part 3 of this comment, infra. The right to appraisal, in the absence of
the option of retaining the shares, will not save a recapitalization plan abolishing vested
rights. Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N. E. (2d) 127 (1938).
23
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generally upheld,28 since it subordinates the dividend claims of the old
preferred to those of the new prior preferred only, and still preserves
their stranglehold on surplus with respect to the common and other
junior security interests. This alteration solely of preferences leaves
vested rights untrammeled, and hence in no wise violates the limitations of the Keller case.29
2.

Thus frustrated, as it were, in its attempts to purge arrearages by
the device of charter amendment, corporate management turned to
recapitalization along the lines of consolidation and merger. Federal
United Corporation v. Havender 30 subjected this method to its first
real test. Faced with aggregate dividend accumulations of $5rn,748,
and with no net earnings from ordinary operations,81 the parent corporation merged with a wholly-owned subsidiary. The plan provided
for a new issue of preferred of the parent to replace the old preferred,
and for cancellation of accumulated dividend arrears on the old preferred. A minority preferred stockholder demanded an injunction on
the ground that a merger could not be used as a subterfuge to wipe out
the accumulated dividends when such change could not be accomplished
by amendment. In overruling this contention,82 the Delaware Supreme
Court asserted that the catholic quality of the language in the merger
statute 33 negatives a technical construction if the purpose of the statute
is to be achieved.
28
Shanik v. White Sewing Mach. Corporation, (Del. Ch. 1940) 15 A. (2d)
169; Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N. E. (2d) 127 (1938); Harr
v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) 65 F. (2d) 332; Salt Lake Automobile Co. v. Keith-O'Brien Co., 45 Utah 218, 143 P. 1015 (1914). This may
serve as a convenient alternative to direct scaling-down. See Stempf, "Revamping Capital Structures," 16 NAT. AssN. CoST AccouNTANTS BuLL. 267 (1934); 4 UNIV. CHI.
L. REV. 645 (1937).
29
Shanik v. White Sewing Mach. Corp., (Del. Ch. 1940) 15 A. (2d) 169,
decided subsequent to both the Keller and Havender cases, held valid the issue of prior
preference stock, and at the same time referred to the Keller case as still binding.
80
(Del. 1940) II A. (2d) 331.
81
Subtracting the stated capital from the actual value of the property and securities
owned by the corporation at the time of the merger, there existed a corporate surplus
of $744,988.16. This was not all earned surplus, however, but was available for the
declaration of dividends.
32
In the chancellor's opinion, the corporate proceeding complained of, while
styled a merger, was no more than an unauthorized attempt at a recapitalization of the
defendant corporation, ineffective, as against objection, to extinguish accumulated dividends within the rule announced in the Keller case.
88
Del. Laws (1937), c. 131, § 2, provides for merger or consolidation of a
parent corporation with a wholly-owned subsidiary. Del. Rev. Code (1935), § 2091,
provides for general consolidation and merger. The agreement is required to set forth
the terms and conditions of merger, and the manner of conversion of shares, "with such
other details and provisions as are deemed necessary."
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"Consequently, in a case where a merger ... is accomplished in
accordance with the law, the holder of cumulative preference
stock as to which dividends have accumulated may not insist that
his right to the dividends is a fixed contractual right in the nature
of a debt, in that sense vested, and therefore secure against
attack."H
It is to be noted that the court expressly limited this declaration as to
vested rights to the merger situation, and that it carefully distinguished
the Keller case.85 Notwithstanding, it is conceivable that the cumulative
preferred interests received a resounding setback, the reverberations
from which may yet echo through subsequent decisions involving the
charter amendment situation.
There are, however, factors offering some consolation to the preferred holders. In Shanik v. White Sewing Machine Corporation,8° the
Delaware court a few months ago referred to the Keller case as still
binding, and a federal district court quite recently recognized that the
Keller case governs elimination of dividend accumulations by charter
amendment, while the Havender case prevails in the field of merger. 87
Further, the court in the H avender case was chary of its position and
fortified it by reliance upon the doctrine of laches as a self-complete
reason for denying relief to plaintiff. 88
If the doctrine allowing repudiation of accrued, unpaid dividends
were limited to cases wherein two independent corporations underwent
merger or consolidation, its ramifications would not be great, for this
method would not ordinarily be available to most corporations as an
alternative to charter amendment. And in those instances in which
merger or consolidation is desired for other reasons, a change in stock
rights is usually a necessary concomitant to accomplish the intricate
adjustment of interests between stockholders of the constituent cor84
Federal United Corp. v. Havender, (Del. 1940) II A. (2d) 331 at 339.
"In such situation the shareholder is not confronted, as was the complainant in the

Keller case, with a proposed alteration of rights attached to preference stock not within
the contemplation of the law as it stood when the corporation was formed and the
stock issued•••• » Id.
8 ~ See note 34, supra.
88
(Del. Ch. 1940) 15 A. (2d) 169.
81
ln re Community Power & Light Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 901.
88
Bovay v. H. M. Byllesby & Co., (Del. Ch. 1940) 12 A. (2d) 178; McQuillen
v. National Cash Register Co., (D. C. Md. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 639; Windhurst v.
Central Leather Co., IOI N. J. Eq. 543, 138 A. 772 (1927); United Milk Products
Co. v. Lovell, (C. C. A. 6th, 1935) 75 F. (2d) 923; Venner v. New York Cent.
& H. R. R., 177 App. Div. 296, 164 N. Y. S. 626 (1917); 19 ANN. CAS. 1266 at
1269 (1911); 70 A. L. R. 53 (1931).
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porations. 89 When a parent corporation merges with a wholly-owned
subsidiary, however, there is but one group of stockholders, in whose
interests no reconditioning of the capital structure of the parent corporation is necessary.4° Consequently, the courts must scrutinize religiously the cases in which a wholly-owned subsidiary is merged into a
parent corporation to determine whether the subsidiary had a valid
reason for prior existence, or whether it was set up specifically for im·mediate absorption with a view to wiping out vested rights of stockholders.41 Should the door be opened to include the latter type of case,
a ready subterfuge would be available to any corporation to avoid
charter amendment limitations upon the reserved power.42

3.
Consideration has thus far been directed to the scaling down and
cancellation of arrearages from the point of view of the preferred
holder. Many arguments are available, however, to justify the decision in the H avender case, especially since the court definitely asserted
that the public policy of Delaware does not prohibit the compounding
of accumulated dividends. 43
In the first place, to compel payment of all accumulated dividends
before recognition of the claims of junior interests may well cause a
serious impairment of the corporation's reserves, and threaten the
future stability of the enterprise.44 Sensing this, and with realization
of dividends upon their stock far in the offing, junior interests may
prevail upon the management to attempt improvement of the financial
condition of the corporation through dangerous speculation.45 Further,
39 Berle, "Corporate Devices for Diluting Stock Participations," 3 I CoL. L. REv.
1239 (1931); 38 MicH. L. REv. 214 (1939); 45 YALE L. J. 105 (1935); 30
MICH. L. REV. 1074 (1932). Where there is a sale of assets, statutory authorization is
not required. In order to avoid statutory difficulties, a consolidation is often treated as
a sale of assets. See 4 Umv. CHI. L. REV. 645 (1937); 3 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 330
(1936); 20 CAL. L. REv. 421 (1932); 81 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 219 (1932).
40 Unless undue and unnecessary complications in the corporate structure require
elimination through a plan of corporate simplification. See In re Community Power &
Light Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 901.
41 In the Havender case, it seemed clear that the merged subsidiary was not created purely for merger purposes.
42
See the opinions of the two chancellors in the Havender case. Havender v.
Federal United Corp., (Del. Ch. 1939) 6 A. (2d) 618, (Del. Ch. 1938) 2 A. (2d)
143.
43
Note also the language in In re Community Power & Light Co., (D. C. N. Y.
1940) 33 F. Supp. 901.
•
44
That economic reasons favor elimination of accrued cumulative dividends, see
10 TEMP. L. Q. 86 (1935).
45
4 Umv. CHI. L. REv. 645 (1937).
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the capital structure of the corporation may be in urgent need of simplification or general overhauling, which might well result in an increase of earned surplus and a consequent augmentation of the amount
actually paid to the preferred. If new capital is desired from existing
stockholders, no help can be expected from the common unless accumulations are eliminated. And since the amount of outstanding preferred is usually comparatively small, aid from the common may be
indispensable.46
A further rationale is available. Courts are agreed that states have
reserved power to amend corporate charters "for the public interest." 47
Although public interest would not stand the strain of eradication of
arrearages by amendment, recent developments may have elasticized
the concept to the extent that abolition by merger can be said to be in
the public interest. Indeed, it was conceded in the H avender case that
the terms of the merger were in all respects fair and equitable. And
since a fair plan has, in effect, been deemed in the public interest with
respect to reorganizations under section 77B and Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act,48 an assumption that this idea has permeated into
the field of recapitalization by merger of solvent corporations is not
unwarranted.
Quite understandably, the preferred holders usually are not so
altruistic as to let these factors dampen their desire for accrued dividends. Their forte is that cumulative preferred stock held out to them
as prudent investors the promise of protection, upon the strength of
which they purchased their stock; that the reserved-power statutes did
not then, nor do they now, authorize destruction of dividend rights;
that courts have consistently refused to allow elimination of dividend
arrearages in dissolution; 49 that a merger approximates dissolution, thus
entitling them to specific enforcement of their dissolution rights, including the right to past accumulations; so that noncumulative preferred is
not highly regarded as an investment, and hence if the guarantees of
46
In the Havender case, certain large holders of common stock, in order to assist
the capitalization of the company and to provide a surplus out of which dividends
could be paid on the new preferred stock, donated 1418 shares of the preferred stock
and a larger amount of common. The preferred alone had an actual value of $73,161.40.
47
31 ILL. L. REV. 661 (1937).
48
Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 33 S. Ct. 554 (1913); Case v.
Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. I (1939); Consolidated
Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 675, noted in 39 M1cH. L. REV.
1222 (1941).
49
Penington v. Commonwealth Hotel Const. Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 394, 155 A.
514 (1931).
50
Petry v. Harwood Electric Co., 280 Pa. 142, 124 A. 302 (1924); contra,
United Milk Products Co. v. Lovell, (C. C. A. 6th, 1935) 75 F. (2d) 923 at 928;
Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., IOI N. J. Eq. 543, 138 A. 772 (1927).
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cumulative preferred are to be rendered hollow and misleading, the
desirability of any type of preferred stock as an investment will disappear; 51 that confiscation of unpaid dividends would as to them violate
due process. 52
Nevertheless, the trend signalized by the H avender decision is
growing. In 1939, the Ohio legislature expanded its reserved power
statute to authorize specifically changes in shares which "may include
the discharge, adjustment or elimination of rights to accrued undeclared cumulative dividends...." 53 More recently the provision of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act 54 subjecting holding companies
and subsidiaries to control by the Securities and Exchange Commission
and authorizing enforcement of a plan for corporate simplification was
held to permit compounding of arrearages 'in preferred stock dividends.55
The funding of arrears 56 is a helpful alternative to the destruction
or scaling-down of accrued dividends. Although the corporation is not
relieved of liability thereby, there is a tripartite benefit: junior securityholders are moved forward in allocation of dividends; preferred arrears are transformed from contingent claims into concrete securities;
and the strain upon current financing of the corporation is lessened.
The funding certificates may be made redeemable far enough in the
future to allow the corporation a breathing-spell.
The decision in the H avender case raises a miscellany of interesting
problems. One of the most vital is whether accrued dividends shall
henceforth be excluded in the valuation of the stock of dissenting preferred holders who elect to take cash payment under the appraisal
statutes. A close examination of the opinion sheds little light, for the
court states merely that the corporation on appraisal must pay the
value of the stock exclusive of any elemen~ of value arising from the
expectation or accomplishment of the merger. If arrearages are still
to be given substantial consideration in the determination of appraisal
rights, a partial loophole appears. Dissenters could by electing ap51 Noncumulative preferred is often termed "the waif of the stock exchanges."
See Berle, "Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock," 23 CoL. L. REV. 358 (1923). See
also JAMES, CAsEs oN BusINESS AssocIATIONS 917 (1937) (data derived from a study
of noncumulative stock issues).
52 Dodd, "Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters," 75
UNIV. PA. L. REV. 585, 723 (1927).
58
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. 1939), § 8623-14 (i).
54 Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, §§ I I (b) (2), I I (e), 49
Stat. L. 820 (1935), 15 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), §§ 79k (b) (2), 79k (e).
55 In re Community Power & Light Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 901.
56 Willcox v. Trenton Potteries Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 173, 53 A. 474 (1902);
46 YALE L. J. 985 (1937).
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praisal recover the value of their shares plus accumulations, and then
buy back into the corporation. In view of this theory, it would seem
that the result in the H avender case may black out accrued dividends
under appraisal statutes, at least in marked degree. 57
A possible solution to the entire problem would allow alteration of
"special rights," either by charter amendment or by merger or consolidation, where there is an urgent need of new :financing. If doubt
exists as to such need, or if there is a probability that selfish interests
are being served, the minority should be protected in equity. 58 The
operative factors are the type of statutes under which the amendment
or merger is attempted, the explicitness of the reserved power provisions, and the business necessity of recapitalization. Omnipresent, as
well, is the desirability of keeping the corporation going versus the
desirability of protecting the small investor, who is an important source
of capital. 59
Despite the apparent preponderance of cases protecting dividend
accumulations, many corporations have succeeded in wiping out or scaling down dividend arrearages. This is true because a large number of
recapitalization plans, in the absence of effectively organized opposition, never are adjudicated. The informed investor must hence realize
today that many of the preferences attached to preferred stock are
"mere trimmings," and that the security ostensibly offered thereby
may be more a dream than a reality. 00
William D. Sutton

51 Reaching the opposite conclusion are 24 MINN. L. REv. 992 (1940); 88
UNIV. PA. L. REv. 624 (1940).
58 Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine Co., IOI N. J.
Eq. 554, 139 A. 50 (1927). In this case, although no fraud was present, the court
rejected a proposed recapitalization on the ground that the plan was unfair.
59 25 CoRN. L. Q. 431 (1940).
00 See 4 UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 645 (1937); 22 MINN. L. REv. 676 (1938).

